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Abstract 
Sigmund Freud pioneered the exploration of the reality of unconscious instinctual drives 
that constitute the essence of the individual’s personality and therefore of his behavior. 
Herbert Marcuse, basing himself primarily on Freud’s theoretical conception, attempts 
in Eros and Civilization to both expose the existence and illustrate the workings of a 
capitalist civilization whose progress has been marked by domination and ‘surplus-
repression’. 
Theodor Adorno, however, in his essay Sociology and Psychology, argues that an 
attempt to derive the social totality in terms of the instinctual psychic personality is 
problematic, as this totality transcends the psyche and actually mediates it under its 
organization. In this paper we will contrast both approaches, based on some significant 
texts, and raise the problem of the method of Psychoanalysis and science in the social 
context of modern civilization. Our intention is to question the demarcation between 
philosophy and science in modern readings of Eros in Psychoanalysis. 
Keywords: Freud, Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Eros, Psychoanalysis, science 
 
Resumo  
Sigmund Freud foi pioneiro na exploração da realidade das tendências inconscientes que 
na sua visão constituem a essência da personalidade individual e portanto do seu 
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comportamento. Herbert Marcuse, baseando-se sobretudo na visão teórica de Freud 
tentou em Eros e Civilização expor a sua existência e ilustrar o seu funcionamento numa 
civilização capitalista cujo devir seria marcado pela ‘sobre repressão’. 
Teodoro Adorno, contudo, no ensaio Sociology and Psychology, argumentou que a 
tentativa de fazer derivar a totalidade do mundo social nos termos definidos a partir dos 
instintos psíquicos da personalidade humana é bastante problemática, pois essa 
totalidade transcende a psiquê e é realmente mediada pela sua organização. Neste artigo 
contrastamos ambas as abordagens, baseados nos textos que considerámos mais 
significativos e levantamos o problema do método psicanalítico e da ciência no contexto 
social da moderna civilização. A nossa intenção é questionar a actual demarcação entre 
filosofia e ciência nas leituras modernas do Eros na psicanálise; na medida em que um 
texto tão breve o permite. 
Keywords: Freud, Marcuse, Teodoro Adorno, Eros, Psicanálise e ciência. 
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1. The problem of human repression under the economic organization, and how to 
account for this 
Through his revolutionary theories, Sigmund Freud pioneered the exploration of the 
reality of unconscious instinctual drives that constitute the essence of the individual’s 
personality and therefore of his behavior. Freud, of course, was not unaware of the 
relation between men’s passions and desires, conscious and unconscious, and the social 
context, that he approached, e.g., in his 1930 book Civilization and its discontents 
(Freud, 2005)2, but the effects of the socio-economic framework on human life were 
never developed by him. 
Basing himself primarily on Freud’s theoretical conception, in Eros and Civilization, 
Herbert Marcuse attempts to both expose the existence and illustrate the workings of a 
[capitalist] civilization whose progress has been plagued by domination and ‘surplus-
repression’—and thus explores the bondage of the individual in terms of Freud’s 
analysis of the human psyche.  
In his essay « Sociology and Psychology » , however, Theodor Adorno argues that an 
attempt to derive the social totality in terms of the instinctual psychic personality is 
problematic, as this totality transcends the psyche and actually mediates it under its 
organization.  
Facing both these thinkers is a human society that has fallen victim to a dominating 
economic organization, one that alienates man and rationalizes the repression necessary 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank Prof Parker Everett, University of Chicago, for his advice throughout the process of 
writing this paper and to the numerous colleagues, both in Paris and Chicago, both in favor and against our 
approach, who made suggestions while this paper circulated as a working paper. 
In this article we assume basic knowledge of the concepts of Freud’s theory of sexuality, and both Marcuse 
and Adorno theories, to focus in a specific problem.  For example, we do not try to explain Freudian concepts 
such as the pleasure or reality principle (including their relationship) or even why civilization is synonymous 
with repression, a relation that helps to differentiate Marcuse from Freud.  
2 He maintained, e.g. that religion – once necessary to restrain man's violent nature in the early stages of 
civilization – in modern times, can be set aside in favor of science Cf. Freud, 2005. 
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to sustain this. Marcuse finds answer to this problem in a complex but fragile and 
ambitious link between Freud’s theory and the alienating system of labor; while Adorno 
argues that such a link is impossible, as the difficulties in doing so reflect an actual 
objective contradiction between the individual and society.  
2. Marcuse and the reality and pleasure principles in contemporary society 
Marcuse asks whether the conflict between Freud’s « pleasure principle » (cf. 
Jones,1964)3 and  the reality principle that subdues it is « irreconcilable to such a degree 
that it necessitates the repressiveness of man’s instinctual structure » (Marcuse, 1966, 5). 
Through this question, he attempts to explore the concept of a non-repressive 
civilization. Though he notes that Freud himself argues for the irreconcilability of the 
two principles as a pre-requisite of civilization, Marcuse argues that Freud’s own 
theoretical conception contains elements that break through this irreconcilability 
(Marcuse, 1966, 5). Attempting to « reinterpret Freud’s theoretical conception in terms 
of its…socio-historical content », Marcuse makes clear his opposition to the revisionist 
Neo-Freudian schools, who reject the sociological elements of Freud’s theory (Marcuse, 
1966, 5).  Moreover, Marcuse argues that precisely these rejected concepts provide « the 
most concrete insights into the historical structure of civilization » — despite the fact 
that Freud himself treats these as tentative preliminary hypotheses — and thus attempts 
to uncover the ‘instinctual roots’ behind the specific organization of reality (Cf. 
Marcuse, 1966, 6-7, 87). 
According to Marcuse, Freud’s equation of civilization with repression should not only 
be questioned, but he also suggests that, in fact, that « intensified progress seems to be 
bound up with intensified unfreedom » and that « repressiveness is the more vigorously 
maintained the more unnecessary it becomes » (Marcuse, 1966, 4). Though agreeing 
with Freud that the progress of culture does necessitate some degree of instinctual 
repression, Marcuse differentiates between basic repression—the instinctual repression 
that is always and everywhere necessary to effect man’s change from the ‘human animal 
to the animal sapiens’ and thus render civilization possible—and surplus-repression, 
repression acting as the agent of domination (Cf. Marcuse, 1966, 38). He argues that, in 
the history of civilization after the advent of capitalism, the two forms of repression 
have been inextricably intertwined. Capitalism rendered some labor and repression 
unnecessary, he maintains, yet the surplus-repression remained. 
As repression has been enforced in the name of progress, Marcuse also explores the 
process of the pleasure principle’s subjugation under the reality principle4. Marcuse calls 
                                                          
3 Though Freud revised his theory of the instincts multiple times, the notion of a pleasure principle as the 
driving force of the instincts is consistent. Cf. Jones,1964.  
4 Marcuse does not simply take over the categories of Freud, nor do we assert this, that would imply to gloss 
over a number of significant differences between them.  E. g. Marcuse claims that the various component 
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the specific reality principle of capitalist civilization the performance principle 
(Marcuse, 1966, 35). Behind it lies the attitude of productivity — holding that man must 
be productive in labor because he lives in a world that cannot satisfy his needs without 
requiring restraint and work. Marcuse argues, however, that, under current industrial 
civilization, scarcity is no longer a matter of its ‘brute fact’, but of its «specific 
organization» (Marcuse, 1966, 35). This specific organization of scarcity imposes and 
necessitates surplus-repression to perpetuate the dominating organization of reality to 
which it belongs. In light of Marcuse’s criteria for gauging repression — «the scope and 
intensity of instinctual repression obtain their full significance only in relation to the 
historically possible extent of freedom» (Marcuse, 1966, 88) —the current societal 
organization under the performance principle appears as an explicit denial of the 
potentiality of freedom in industrial civilization.  
The performance principle’s repressive organization of sexuality is the foremost 
expression of Marcuse’s attempt to reveal a direct link between Freud’s theory and the 
dominating nature of civilization, a direct correlation between a repressive instinctual 
organization and the dominating system of labor sustained by it. From Freud’s theory of 
sexuality, Marcuse elaborates that, under the reality principle, the various component 
instincts of infantile sexuality are unified and subjugated into genital primacy and the 
procreative function, and argues that procreative sexuality is then channeled into 
«monogamic» institutions (Cf. Marcuse, 1966, 41). While acknowledging this 
instinctual repression by the reality principle, Marcuse points out that the external world 
faced by the ego is a specific socio-historical organization of reality, materialized in and 
affecting the psychic structure through societal institutions and agents, laws and values, 
which together constitute the «body» of the reality principle (Marcuse, 1966, 37).  
Moreover, while any form of the reality principle requires a certain degree of instinctual 
control and repression, this ‘body’ of the specific reality principle imposes additional or 
surplus constraints, « over and above those indispensable » for civilization and thus 
repression solely in the interests of societal domination. Into this system of institutions 
and agents in the services of domination he groups procreative sexuality channeled into 
monogamic institutions. And exposing these as agents of surplus-repression for the 
performance principle, Marcuse reveals the link between the repression of infantile 
sexuality (and the instinctual modification it implies) and the dominating reality 
principle, in other words, the sociological dimensions of Freud’s theory.  
Marcuse also claims that, through a repressive unification of the various component 
instincts of infantile sexuality that implies a denial of their ‘autonomous development’, 
the nature of sexuality is transformed « from an autonomous principle governing the 
entire organism…into a specialized temporary function » (Marcuse, 1966, 41). The 
nature of Eros, the life principle behind sexuality, is thus transformed. Subsequently, the 
                                                                                                                                                      
instincts of infantile sexuality are altered. This may need to be unpacked and discussed in much detail, but 
would demand the inclusion of a section summarizing Freud’s theories, which is completely outside the 
scope of this essay. 
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success of this process achieves the «socially necessary desexualization of the body: the 
libido becomes concentrated in one part of the body, leaving most of the rest free for use 
as the instrument of labor» (Marcuse, 1966, 48). Therefore, in Marcuse’s analysis, the 
organization of the sexual instincts enforced by the ‘body’ of the performance principle 
directly correlates with the interests of the system of labor.  
Marcuse argues that the reason why this does not appear as problematic is that, in the 
perpetuation of the performance principle, repression becomes ‘rationalized’, as 
domination no longer sustains merely specific privileges but also the framework of 
society as a whole (cf. Marcuse, 1966, 45, 91). Under its rule, the individual is rewarded 
with a higher standard of living, but he remains ignorant that these fruits of the 
performance principle blind him from the awareness that he « could both work less and 
determine »  his « own needs and satisfactions » (Marcuse, 1966, 94) . Alternatively, he 
argues that, in a societal state that «released the free play of individual needs and 
faculties», the body would no longer be used as the full-time instrument of labor and 
would therefore be ‘resexualized’ (Cf. Marcuse, 1966, 208). According to Marcuse, this 
‘resexualization’ in turn implies a «reactivation of erotogenic zones», whereupon the 
body in its entirety would become an instrument of pleasure, making work pleasurable 
and improving libidinal relationships (Cf. Marcuse, 1966, 201-202, 210).  
Marcuse thus bases his theory on Freud’s own theory of the psychical personality and of 
the instincts. By demonstrating that the repressive organization of sexuality corresponds 
with a reality principle that, for the services of its perpetuation, makes use of this 
modification of libidinal energy, Marcuse attempts to derive the latter from the former 
(i.e. derive the dominating capitalist society and its performance principle from the 
repression of instinctual drives)5.  
In a paper titled Sociology and Psychology, Theodore Adorno confronts the dominating 
organization of reality in a different way. His theory does not derive from Freud’s theory 
the way Marcuse’s does, but, rather, exposes the shortcomings of such an approach in 
the face of the objective societal antagonism. 
3. Adorno and the limits of psychological and sociological explanation 
Adorno’s criticism in « The Continuum between Neurosis and Psychosis » in part II of 
Sociology and Psychology, printed in The New Left Review, contains the various 
elements of his theory of an antagonistic society. This text does not change Adorno’s 
fundamental ideas on the subject, which were expressed in a Conference held in 1946 in 
                                                          
5  To include other texts and works, such as Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and the Essay on Liberation, 
or  for Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Minimia Moralia, and Dialectics of Enlightenment might help to build 
up this interpretation, but would take us too far away from the main argument. 
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San Francisco, unpublished in English until 1952 (Cf. Adorno, 2007, 7), but we prefer, 
however, to refer to the more recent paper6. 
He argues that the dynamic of this antagonistic society creates problems that are 
manifested in the obstacles facing psychological therapy, as well as in those facing 
psychology, not to mention the light in which psychology views the object of its study 
(Adorno, 1968, 94). Looking into various particulars of psychoanalysis, Adorno links 
these observations with his larger societal theory.  
Adorno observes that, in the case of psychotics, their defenses against unconscious 
impulses—stemming from the ego—are supposed to be bolstered, whilst those of 
neurotics broken down (cf. Adorno, 1968, 94). In terms of the affinity—acknowledged 
in psychoanalysis—existing between neurosis and psychosis, this practice of insisting on 
more consciousness for one patient while protecting the other «against the…danger that 
is…invoked as the first patient’s salvation» constitutes a «nonsensical» dualism, 
according to Adorno (1968, 94). On the same note, however, Adorno emphasizes that 
this same dualism of treatment is not merely an inconsistency on the part of therapy, but 
reflects and mimics an objective contradiction in the societal organization.  
Moreover, Adorno argues that, in reducing «everything it calls unconscious…to the 
same thing», in extracting the psyche from the social dialectic and investigating it as an 
«abstract ‘for itself’ » , psychoanalysis «makes a first principle out of a mediated 
product» — namely, the psyche of «the bourgeois individual» (Adorno, 1968, 79, 81, 
96). Psychoanalysis’ abstraction of the psyche as a ‘for itself’, Adorno continues, is «all 
too consistent with a society that hires and fires people as so many units of abstract 
labor-power» (Adorno, 1968, 81). Thus, Adorno seeks to reveal the reality that 
psychoanalysis tends to take as objective fact something that is actually mediated by the 
societal organization, namely, the individual psyche. He argues that, under this illusion 
of objectivism, psychoanalysis attempts to give a «psychological explanation for what 
does not derive from the individual psyche» (Adorno, 1967, 74). In essence, this ‘one-
sidedness’ of psychoanalysis’ object of study mimics the one-sidedness of an apparatus 
that sees individuals as units serving to perpetuate it and governs their relations 
«according to the dictates of exchange-value» (Adorno, 1967, 74).  
In light of the impossibility of giving a ‘psychological explanation for what does not 
derive from the psyche’, Adorno criticizes Freud’s attempts to solve sociological 
problems psychologically, to derive the objective totality from the mediated end-result 
of the individual psyche. Under the hierarchical division of labor and its alienating, one-
sided conception of man determined by his labor capacity, the individual’s instinctual 
structure is mediated and cannot be analyzed objectively.  
                                                          
6 The San Francisco paper represents a previous and less mature conception and remained unknown to the 
general public and was seldom mentioned in this debate. 
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4. Adorno against Marcuse? 
In this sense, Adorno would seem to criticize Marcuse, for his own theory in Eros and 
Civilization is based on Freud’s ‘theoretical conception’ and therefore falls vulnerable to 
the same objections. Marcuse’s attempt to uncover the ‘instinctual roots’ of the 
performance principle rings of the same error of trying to uncover a ‘psychological 
explanation for what does not derive from the individual psyche’ and taking the findings 
of psychoanalysis as objective, unmediated facts. 
In the face of this problem and the one-sidedness of the dominating order, Adorno does 
provide a solution. He argues that this one-sidedness must be pursued — in the case of 
psychoanalysis—by an investigation of its object of study without its abstraction to 
explain reality outside of its scope, in order to come closer to an understanding of the 
actual one-sidedness of the antagonistic society. By pursuing this one-sidedness, Adorno 
maintains, «there is more hope that concentration on the particular isolate will break 
through its monadic crust to disclose the universal mediation at its core» (Adorno, 1967, 
74). By focusing of its object of study alone, without abstracting it to account for the 
societal reality, psychoanalysis can come closer to understanding how the societal 
mediation of the psyche actually works.  
The different ways in which these two thinkers approach the problem of the societal 
domination confronting man are thus contrasted. Adorno exposes the shortcomings of 
Freud’s attempts at explaining sociological problems psychologically, deriving the 
general from the particular and therefore exhausting psychoanalysis’ field of study7. By 
following a theory that both exhausts its scope and takes as objective fact an end result 
that is actually mediated, Marcuse falls vulnerable to Adorno’s theoretical criticism. 
This problem, according to Adorno, is not one that can be overcome by a conceptual 
abstraction and quantitative information; for, so long as the organization of reality sees 
individuals as labor capacities for its own perpetuation, only an awareness of thisone-
sidedness and an investigation free from attempts at conceptual psychological 
abstraction can lead to an understanding of the fundamental problem in this dynamic.  
This means that sociological domination should not be explained (solely) crossing the 
psycho-social divide, in the happy expression of Cavalletto (cf. 2007, 11-36). 
Even Marcuse, in the new preface to the Vintage Edition, acknowledges some 
insufficiencies of his method, or at least the provisional status of his theories: « I have 
sufficiently (and perhaps unduly) stressed the progressive and promising aspects of this 
                                                          
7On the treatment of sublimation in Adorno cf. Goebel, 2012, 193-224. 
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development in order to be entitled to accentuate here the negative » (Marcuse, 1962, 
xi.). 
5. Conclusion: Objectivity and the method of Psychoanalysis 
We can therefore reach the conclusion, as others recent critics did, that «[o]nly 
dogmatism can today still blind one to the fact that a string of premises of Freudian 
theory have in the meantime become highly questionable»8; or at least question the 
scientific value of Vulgar Marxism applied to psychoanalysis (cf. the excelent essay of 
Whitebook, 2004, 51-78). 
Notwithstanding, it is difficult not to see that both Marcuse and Adorno shared a 
powerful insight on the consequences of the organization of modern life and society 
concerning the impoverishment of love and eroticism, maybe as a result from the « 
conscious separation of the instinctual from the intellectual sphere » (Marcuse, 1962, x.). 
Even if morality is not self-evident (Adorno, 2001, 5, however 167 and ff), it should not 
be expelled from the exploration of the reality of unconscious instinctual drives  
The divide between these two members of the Frankfurt School is the divide concerning 
which scientific method should be pursued in exploring this problem, an extension of 
(Marxian) sociology (Marcuse), or a specific (Marxian) psychological method (Adorno). 
Suspicious could arise, however, that neither Freudian revisionist method passes the test 
of demarcation between philosophy and science: verification. In the words of Karl 
Popper, «[s]ome of the famous leaders of German sociology who do their intellectual 
best, and do it with the best conscience in the world, are nevertheless, I believe, simply 
talking trivialities in high sounding language (…)» (Adorno et alia, 1976, 296). 
Moreover, if we are dealing with genuine philosophical and non-scientific problems, 
perhaps a deeper, and certainly more beautiful, starting point can be found in the Ladder 
of Love that Socrates reveals in the Symposium. 
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